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I. INTRODUCTION 
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.1 represents a 
new and important chapter in the relationship between the forum selection 
clause and modern business relations.  A forum selection clause is “[a] 
contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the 
country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.”2  Forum 
selection clauses have most often been analyzed by courts within contractual 
relationships between businesses,3 or a business and its customers.4  The 
Boilermakers case sets important precedent for forum selection in an equally 
fundamental business relationship—the corporation and its stockholders.5  This 
article will survey the key points of the Boilermakers case and, in so doing, will 
hopefully complement the insightful conversation led by then Chief Justice 
Myron Steele about the case at the Pepperdine University’s Journal of Business, 
Entrepreneurship and the Law’s Fall 2013 symposium. 
II. CASE PROCEDURE AND BACKGROUND 
Forum selection clause provisions in corporate bylaws (forum selection 
bylaws) are becoming commonplace.  “Generally speaking, a forum selection 
bylaw is a provision in a corporation’s bylaws that designates a forum as the 
exclusive venue for certain stockholder suits against the corporation, either as an 
actual or nominal defendant, and its directors and employees.”6  “In the last 
three years, over 250 publicly traded corporations have adopted such 
provisions.”7  The Boilermakers litigation stems from twelve such companies, 
all of whom adopted similar forum selection bylaws in regards to corporate 
governance suits by stockholders.8  Complaints were filed against each of these 
                                                            
1 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
2 In re Oracle Corp., 399 Fed. App’x 587, 589 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009)). 
3 See, e.g. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
4 See, e.g. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591 (1991). 
5 Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 937−38. 
6 Id. at 941−42. 
7 Id. at 944 (citation omitted). 
8 Id. at 944−45. 
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companies to challenge such bylaws in the Court of Chancery of Delaware on 
“substantively identical” grounds by the same law firm.9  “Ten of the twelve 
defendant corporations repealed their bylaws,” prompting the respective 
plaintiffs to dismiss their complaints.10  Defendants Chevron Corporation 
(Chevron) and FedEx Corporation (FedEx), however, stood by such bylaws and 
answered these complaints.11  The court consolidated the actions for the purpose 
of deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Chevron and FedEx 
regarding the facial validity of such bylaws.12 
III. THE FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS 
Delaware law provides the power to “adopt, amend[,] or repeal bylaws 
shall be in the stockholders,” unless stockholders decide to place such power 
within the hands of the corporation’s board of directors.13  The certificates of 
incorporation for both Chevron and FedEx had so empowered their respective 
boards.14  Using such authority, the boards for both Chevron and FedEx 
unilaterally adopted an identical forum selection bylaw without stockholder 
vote, which was similarly provided for in each corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation.15  The bylaw read as follows: 
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an 
alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 
shall be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or 
proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action 
asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, 
officer[,] or other employee of the Corporation to the Corporation or 
the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim 
arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by 
the internal affairs doctrine.  Any person or entity purchasing or 
otherwise acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the 
Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to the 
provisions of this [bylaw].16 
Chevron’s board eventually amended this bylaw to allow for suit in either 
state or federal court in Delaware and limited the bylaw’s scope to only those 
                                                            
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 945. 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 938–39, 945–47. 
13 Id. at 941 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2010)). 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 941–42. 
16 Id. at 942. 
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cases where a Delaware court had personal jurisdiction over all “indispensable” 
parties.17  Importantly, whereas both Chevron and FedEx are incorporated in 
Delaware, Chevron is headquartered in California, and FedEx is headquartered 
in Tennessee.18 
The court made it a point to emphasize Chevron and FedEx were not 
attempting to limit “what suits may be brought against the corporations, only 
where internal governance suits may be brought.”19  The court quoted the 
explanation given by Chevron and FedEx as to the four types of internal 
corporate governance suits encompassed under the bylaw: 
• Derivative suits. The issue of whether a derivative plaintiff is 
qualified to sue on behalf of the corporation and whether that 
derivative plaintiff has or is excused from making demand on the 
board is a matter of corporate governance, because it goes to the 
very nature of who may speak for the corporation. 
• Fiduciary duty suits. The law of fiduciary duties regulates the 
relationships between directors, officers, the corporation, and its 
stockholders. 
• D.G.C.L. suits. The Delaware General Corporation Law provides 
the underpinning framework for all Delaware corporations.  That 
statute goes to the core of how such corporations are governed. 
• Internal affairs suits. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, 
“internal affairs,” in the context of corporate law, are those “matters 
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and 
its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”20 
IV. EXPRESSED MOTIVATION FOR THE FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS 
The boards of Chevron and FedEx explained they had adopted such forum 
selection bylaws in an attempt to prevent the costs of “multiforum litigation” for 
corporate governance claims.21  For purposes of corporate governance actions, 
personal jurisdiction is available against the corporation and its board at least in 
its incorporation state and its principal place of business—headquarters.22  
Because many corporations like Chevron and FedEx have decided to incorporate 
in Delaware and establish headquarters in another state, such corporations and 
                                                            
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 943. 
20 Id. at 942–43. 
21 Id. at 943. 
22 Id. 
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their boards are subject to suits for one corporate action in both forums 
simultaneously.23   
Chevron and FedEx explained such simultaneous, multiforum litigation 
imposes “needless” expenses, which amount to “high costs on the 
corporation[].”24  Chevron and FedEx argued such costs create harm to the 
investors and stockholders themselves, which are “not justified by rational 
benefits for stockholders from multiforum filings.”25  As the court summarized, 
“the boards of Chevron and FedEx claim to have tried to minimize or eliminate 
the risk of what they view as wasteful[,] duplicative litigation by adopting the 
forum selection bylaws.”26 
V. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund, Key West Police and 
Fire Pension Fund, and Iclub Investment Partnership (collectively, Plaintiffs) 
had two claims, which were the subject of the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings before the court.27  First, “[P]laintiffs claimed that the bylaws [were] 
statutorily invalid because they [were] beyond the board’s authority under the 
Delaware General Corporation Law . . .”—the statutory validity claim.28  
Second, Plaintiffs claimed the forum selection bylaws cannot be enforced like 
contractual forum selection clauses have historically been because the boards 
unilaterally adopted such bylaws—the contractual validity claims.29  Essentially, 
they claimed the forum selection clause jurisprudence, which has typically 
analyzed a more traditional contractual situation, should not apply to the 
proposed forum selection bylaws.  In addition to these two specific claims, the 
Plaintiffs made the broader argument the forum selection bylaws might operate 
“unreasonably” under a myriad of hypothetical situations.30  As will be seen 
below, this broader reasonability argument relates to the fundamental fairness of 
a forum selection clause, which has traditionally been one particular focus of 
analysis where forum selection clause jurisprudence is applied.31 
 
                                                            
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 944. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 938. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 See infra Part VI. 
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VI. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE PLAINTIFFS’ HYPOTHETICAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR POTENTIAL UNFAIRNESS 
Importantly, the Plaintiffs were not actually bringing a specific corporate 
governance suit under the challenged bylaws.32  Instead, the Plaintiffs were 
facially challenging the forum selection bylaws themselves by presenting 
hypothetical factual scenarios that might make the operation of such bylaws 
unreasonable in the future.33  Because the Plaintiffs were making a facial 
challenge to the bylaws, the standard of proof required them to show the 
“bylaws [could not] operate lawfully or equitably under any circumstances.”34  
Because the Plaintiffs “voluntarily assumed this burden by making a facial 
validity challenge, [they could not] satisfy it by pointing to some future 
hypothetical application of the bylaws that might be impermissible.”35  This was 
essentially the nail in the coffin for what would be the Plaintiffs’ fairness or 
reasonability argument, as the court concluded “[t]he answer to the possibility 
that a statutorily and contractually valid bylaw may operate inequitably in a 
particular scenario is for the party facing a concrete situation to challenge the 
case-specific application of the bylaw . . . .”36 
VII. QUESTIONS ANSWERED: UNILATERALLY ADOPTED FORUM SELECTION 
BYLAWS OF THIS KIND ARE STATUTORILY AND CONTRACTUALLY VALID UNDER 
DELAWARE LAW 
A. Statutory Validity: The Subject Matter of the Forum Selection Bylaws 
Was Encompassed by the Broad Language of Section 109(b) of the 
Delaware Code 
Section 109(b) broadly provides corporate “bylaws may contain any 
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, 
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its 
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers[,] 
or employees.”37  The court’s analysis for statutory validity focused on whether 
the bylaws were related to the corporate “affairs” and the “rights” of 
stockholders portions of this provision and seemed to reserve the “inconsistent 
                                                            
32 See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 947–48. 
33 See id. (emphasis removed). 
34 Id. at 948. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2010). 
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with law” caveat for the contractual validity claim as its substance overlapped.38 
First, the court found the forum selection bylaws “plainly” related to the 
“conduct of [the corporations’] affairs” because the bylaws provided a procedure 
for how to resolve “internal affairs claims” of the corporation.39  The court 
explained the importance of this was the decision by the boards to “channel[] 
internal affairs cases into the courts of the state of incorporation, [which 
provided] for the opportunity to have internal affairs cases resolved 
authoritatively by [the Delaware] Supreme Court . . . .”40  In sum, because the 
forum selection bylaws were by definition setting the procedure for the 
“conduct” of corporate “affairs,” such bylaws furthered a proper statutory 
purpose.41 
Second, the court similarly found, by “a matter of easy linguistics,” such 
bylaws also addressed the “rights” of stockholders.42  According to the court, the 
bylaws very clearly related to the “rights or powers” of the stockholders of these 
corporations because the bylaws provided the critical limitation of where those 
rights may be asserted.43  In an attempt to avoid the seemingly obvious 
application of this broad language, the Plaintiffs attempted to make the 
distinction that the forum selection bylaws were regulating “external” rights of 
the stockholder and not “internal” rights, which were supposed to be the subject 
of bylaws under Section 109(b).44  
The court declined to draw the external/internal rights distinction at the 
court house steps.45  Instead, the court explained the bylaws indeed dealt with 
internal stockholder rights because the “right” that was being regulated was the 
stockholder’s procedural right to bring suit regarding the internal affairs of the 
corporation.46  As the court explained, “[t]hese are the kind of claims most 
central to the relationship between those who manage the corporation and the 
corporation’s stockholders.”47  The court, however, noted a bylaw might run 
afoul of this external right distinction if that “bylaw . . . purported to bind a 
plaintiff, even a stockholder plaintiff, who sought to bring a tort claim against 
the company based on a personal injury she suffered that occurred on the 
company’s premises or a contract claim based on a commercial contract with the 
                                                            
38 See id. at 950–51. 
39 Id. at 951. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 950–51. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. at 951. 
45 See id. at 951–52. 
46 See id. 
47 Id. at 952. 
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corporation.”48  The court labeled the distinction as “obvious”—the bylaws in 
that hypothetical “would not deal with the rights and powers of the plaintiff-
stockholder as a stockholder.”49 
In sum, the court found the forum selection bylaws proffered by Chevron 
and FedEx were valid under Section 109(b) because these bylaws regulated the 
“rights” of stockholders as to the “conduct” of internal corporate “affairs.”50  
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ claim of statutory invalidity was dismissed.51 
B. Contractual Validity: Forum Selection Clause Jurisprudence Will 
Apply to the Forum Selection Bylaws Even Though They Were 
Unilaterally Adopted by the Boards 
The Plaintiffs’ contractual argument was centered on the fact the forum 
selection bylaws were established unilaterally by the boards without any consent 
from the stockholders.52  Essentially, one party to the forum selection clause had 
not bargained for, or even agreed to, the limitation.53  As such, this forum 
selection setup did not resemble those traditional contractual situations that have 
historically supported a forum selection clause.54  The Plaintiffs argued the 
principle of a forum selection bylaw was not per se invalid, but rather such a 
restriction of rights must come from a vote opened to the stockholders 
themselves to come under traditional forum selection clause consideration.55 
The court flatly rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument, explaining it 
“misunderst[ood] . . . [and] . . . misapprehend[ed] fundamental principles of 
Delaware corporate law.”56  The court explained “generations” of Delaware case 
law have established “bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a 
Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”57  The court reminded Plaintiffs, 
when a corporation decides to empower its board to unilaterally adopt or amend 
bylaws, stockholders are on notice the board may adopt any bylaw within its 
power under Section 109(b).58  Accordingly, the court explained such action by 
“the board is not extra-contractual simply because the board acts unilaterally; 
                                                            
48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
50 See id. at 950–54. 
51 Id. at 954. 
52 See id. at 954–55. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 Id. at 940, 955. 
57 Id. at 955. 
58 Id. at 955–56. 
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rather it is the kind of change that the overarching statutory and contractual 
regime the stockholders buy into explicitly allows the board to make on its 
own.”59 
[T]he Chevron and FedEx stockholders have assented to a 
contractual framework established by the DGCL and the certificates 
of incorporation that explicitly recognizes that stockholders will be 
bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by their boards.  Under that 
clear contractual framework, the stockholders assent to not having to 
assent to board-adopted bylaws.  The [P]laintiffs’ argument that 
stockholders must approve a forum selection bylaw for it to be 
contractually binding is an interpretation that contradicts the plain 
terms of the contractual framework chosen by stockholders who buy 
stock in Chevron and FedEx.60 
The court concluded, under this reasoning, the forum selection bylaws 
established by Chevron and FedEx were indeed contractually valid and 
contractually binding.61  Thus, the Plaintiffs’ contractual validity claim was also 
dismissed.62  This finding was important in and of itself to establish the binding 
nature of the bylaw; however, it was perhaps even more important because with 
contractual validity comes the opportunity to apply traditional forum selection 
clause jurisprudence to the bylaw itself.63  This opportunity would normally 
have presented the Plaintiffs with a renewed chance to invalidate the bylaws on 
reasonability or fairness grounds—that is, had the Plaintiffs not presented a 
facial challenge.   
VIII. QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN FOR FUTURE COURTS: DO FORUM SELECTION 
BYLAWS OF THIS KIND OPERATE IN A “REASONABLE” MANNER? 
A. Survey of Forum Selection Clause Jurisprudence 
Since the forum selection bylaws at issue in Boilermakers were statutorily 
and contractually valid, the court explained “the bylaws will also be subject to 
scrutiny under the principles for evaluating contractual forum selection clauses 
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in The Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., and adopted by our Supreme Court.”64  This “scrutiny” is not one 
that creates a barrier for forum selection bylaws.  To the contrary, it is a scrutiny 
                                                            
59 Id. at 956. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 958. 
62 Id.  
63 See id. at 957. 
64 Id.  
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that propels such bylaws onto very solid ground. 
B. Presumptive Validity 
In Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Oil Co., the United States Supreme Court 
officially ushered in the era of the “forum selection clause”.65  The Court 
observed forum selection clauses had been historically disfavored by American 
courts, with many courts having declined “to enforce such clauses on the ground 
that they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that their effect was to ‘oust the 
jurisdiction’ of the court.”66  The Court, however, decided to adopt a more 
“hospitable attitude toward forum-selection clauses” by establishing federal 
courts should find forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid” and 
enforceable “unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 
‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”67   
The Court in Bremen reasoned such a rule “accords with ancient concepts 
of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of 
American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world.”68  The Court 
concluded “in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding 
international trade[,] . . . the forum clause should control absent a strong 
showing that it should be set aside.”69  The general federal rule that emerged 
from Bremen was “a freely negotiated private international agreement, 
unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power . . . 
should be given full effect.”70  This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Delaware in Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc.71   
C. Forum Selection Clauses Remain Broadly Enforceable Even Without 
Bargaining Power or Negotiation 
The context of the forum selection clause in Bremen was a contract 
between two corporations by way of “arm’s-length negotiation by experienced 
and sophisticated businessmen.”72  In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, the United 
States Supreme Court remained highly favorable to the enforceability of a forum 
selection clause even where the forum selection clause was between a large 
                                                            
65 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
66 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9–10, n.10 (citations omitted). 
67 Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 15. 
70 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591 (1991) (citing Bremen, U.S. at 12–13). 
71 Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010). 
72 See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1, 12. 
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international cruise line and a private couple who had purchased cruise tickets.73  
In Carnival, the Court assumed the couple’s “contract was purely routine and 
doubtless nearly identical to every commercial passage contract issued by 
[Carnival] and most other cruise lines.”74  Therefore, it was assumed, like every 
other ordinary passenger, the couple was not able to negotiate the terms of the 
forum selection clause in the ticket.75   
The Court in Carnival explained there were at least three policy rationales 
that supported the holding a forum selection clause should remain presumptively 
valid in this situation, even where bargaining power was non-existent for one 
party to the contract.76  First, “a cruise line has a special interest in limiting the 
fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit” because a cruise line 
“typically carries passengers from many locales” and, therefore, opens itself to 
litigation in “several different fora.”77  Second, a forum selection clause prevents 
confusion about the proper forum and, therefore, spares litigants and courts from 
having to resolve motions relating to the proper location of the lawsuit.78  Third, 
the Court assumed “passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause 
. . . benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line 
enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”79   
D. Fundamental Fairness Scrutiny 
More importantly, the Court found the forum selection clause in Carnival 
further passed required judicial scrutiny for “fundamental fairness.”80  The Court 
in Carnival essentially established a breach of “fundamental fairness” in the 
context of a forum selection clause would be a manifest intent to select a forum 
that would “discourag[e]” customers from pursuing litigation.81  The Court in 
Carnival found that four factors present in the case belied an intent to 
discourage suit.82  First, Carnival had its principal place of business—
headquarters—in the designated forum.83  Second, Carnival conducted a 
                                                            
73 Carnival, 499 U.S. at 587, 593–95. 
74 Id. at 593. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 593–94. 
77 Id. at 593. 
78 Id. at 593–94. 
79 Id. at 594. 
80 Id. at 595. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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substantial amount of business in the designated forum.84  Third, there was no 
evidence Carnival obtained the couple’s assent to the selection clause by “fraud 
or overreaching.”85  Fourth, the couple had “conceded that they were given 
notice of the forum provision and, therefore, presumably retained the option of 
rejecting the contract with impunity.”86 
IX. APPLICATION OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE REASONABILITY AND FAIRNESS 
PRINCIPLES TO A FORUM SELECTION BYLAW OF THIS KIND 
A. The Court Refused to Apply Hypotheticals in a Facial Challenge 
As was explained above, the court in Boilermakers refused to address the 
Plaintiffs’ “conjured up” hypotheticals to determine if the bylaws were 
unreasonable or otherwise lacked fundamental fairness because this was a facial 
challenge.87  The court explained “as-applied challenges to the reasonableness of 
a forum selection clause should be made by a real plaintiff whose real case is 
affected by the operation of the forum selection clause.”88  
B. The Unilateral Nature of a Forum Selection Bylaw Will Not Render It 
Unreasonable or Fundamentally Unfair 
Whereas the court did not wander into applying the Plaintiffs’ 
hypotheticals to determine the reasonability of the forum selection bylaws, the 
court did apply the unilateral nature of the Carnival forum selection clause to 
the case in supporting the fundamental fairness of such a bylaw.89  The court in 
Boilermakers analogized the forum selection bylaws that were unilaterally 
adopted after the stockholder purchased the stock to the Carnival context in 
which the forum selection clause “was not subject to negotiation and was printed 
on the ticket [that the plaintiff] received after she purchased the passage . . . .”90  
The court in Boilermakers opined, because the United States Supreme Court had 
found such a forum selection clause “reasonable” and “enforceable,” so too 
should it find the forum selection bylaw was reasonable.91  The court explained 
the Boilermakers context was likely even more reasonable than that of Carnival 
                                                            
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
88 Id. at 941. 
89 See id. at 957–58. 
90 Id. at 957. 
91 See id. 
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because “stockholders retain the right to modify the corporation’s bylaws.”92 
C. Potential Fairness and Reasonability Applications Remain for Future 
Cases 
The court’s conclusion in Boilermakers that forum selection clause 
jurisprudence applies to forum selection bylaws goes a very long way towards 
securing the practice.  Notably, however, the court made it a point to conclude 
its opinion by securing the opportunity for future plaintiffs to bring as-applied 
challenges to the reasonability or fairness of such bylaws.93  Some of these 
challenges may be bolstered by Carnival itself and its fundamental fairness 
analysis.   
Unlike Carnival, the corporations in this case, and undoubtedly many like 
it, designate a litigation state—Delaware—in which the corporations are not 
actually headquartered or do a substantial percentage of their business.94  Should 
the fundamental fairness that was found for Carnival’s unilateral forum selection 
in that case apply to a forum selection bylaw that requires litigation so far from 
the actual beating heart of the corporation itself?  Would not the same 
multiforum litigation concerns be avoided by designating the forum where the 
corporation is actually headquartered?  Indeed, selection of the state of 
headquarters might arguably be the best, if not only, evidence the corporation’s 
motivation for the bylaw was efficiency and not limiting litigation to a favorable 
forum to potentially discourage suit.  On the other hand, a strong argument 
could be made that the unique procedures that exist in the Court of Chancery 
and the ability to have Delaware courts set precedent for the corporate law that 
governs the corporation, should carry substantial weight in proving a good faith 
motivation.  These, and many other such factors, need further analysis alongside 
the actual facts of an as-applied challenge in the future. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Boilermakers set substantial precedent supporting the validity of forum 
selection bylaws under Delaware law.95  Such forum selection bylaws are valid 
under Section 109(b) and are not otherwise invalid as a matter of contract law.96  
Accordingly, Delaware courts will apply the traditional prima facie presumption 
                                                            
92 Id. at 957–58. 
93 See id. at 963. 
94 Compare Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 942–43, with Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 
585, 595 (1991).  
95 See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 954, 958. 
96 See id. 
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of validity to such forum selection bylaws, subject to a reasonability and 
fundamental fairness inquiry reserved for as-applied factual challenges.97  
Boilermakers has the makings of a case that sets fundamental corporate law for 
generations to come.  Undoubtedly, Boilermakers has been, and will continue to 
be, the subject of many board room discussions amongst Delaware corporations 
who must answer what has become a very important question, Where do we 
want to let our stockholders challenge corporate action?  Or, perhaps more 
importantly, which court are we comfortable with deciding these challenges? 
 
 
                                                            
97 See id. at 957–58. 
